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I. Introduction
The development of peer-to-peer technology platforms, and the even broader adoption of online marketplaces in different business domains provide innovative tools for financial intermediaries. Several companies have redesigned the complex process of household lending by linking borrowers and lenders more directly via online platforms. We refer to these online platforms as marketplace lending platforms and to the related activity as marketplace lending.
Marketplace lending can be interpreted as a particular type of crowdfunding as in Morse (2015) .
This innovation led to the emergence of new financial intermediaries offering competitive financial services along specific dimensions that play an increasingly significant role in household finance. Butler et al. (2016) show that consumers with better access to bank financing receive loans at lower interest rates. Extending this analogy to online platforms, consumers make borrowing decisions while considering most, if not all, of the financing alternatives. De Roure et al. (2016) find that more risky borrowers exhibit greater sensitivity to the availability of competing sources of finance, thus, increasing the likelihood that marketplace lending will have a more pronounced impact among more risky borrowers.
Our findings indicate that loans issued via the largest marketplace lending platform in the US earn substantial risk-adjusted returns of 40 basis points per month. These loans are fixed income securities, and therefore, this abnormal performance is associated with extremely low volatility compared to the volatility of typical equity portfolios. Since the underlying fixed income notes are not actively traded, the potential for abnormal performance should be less surprising compared to simple trading strategies for individual stocks. The abnormal performance for these loans is more analogous to the potential for private equity funds to generate abnormal returns.
However, if this abnormal performance is expected to persist, then this superior performance will attract more capital. Indeed, this pattern has already been established in private equity funds (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) . As capital continues to enter marketplace lending in search of abnormal returns, a new equilibrium is likely to develop.
Marketplace lending is a rapidly growing business. In terms of its loan volume, marketplace lending in the United States amounted to $25.7 billion in 2017. 1 In comparison, credit card debt of US households was $808 billion in the third quarter of 2017. 2 Marketplace lending has been attracting more institutional investors to secure the issued loans (Financial Times, 2014 and . If marketplace lending platforms have substantial market power, then there is the chance that these platforms will extract some of this abnormal performance from investors by raising origination or payment fees. If marketplace lending becomes a very competitive environment, then we might anticipate lower interest rates to attract borrowers and/or a decrease in average loan quality to maintain market share. In each of these cases, we would expect the abnormal returns for portfolios of marketplace loans to eventually disappear as loans in this market reach an equilibrium with other fixed income securities, such as bonds issued by financial institutions and asset backed securities for consumer loan portfolios.
As a consequence, we are particularly interested in investigating the risk and return characteristics of consumer loans issued by marketplace lending platforms. While the volatility of individual loan performance will be extremely important for holders of smaller loan pools, more sophisticated lenders, such as institutional investors, are likely to form substantial portfolios of loans to benefit of diversification. In this context, a performance analysis of a loan portfolios available on marketplace platforms is of critical relevance as this new approach to financial intermediation emerges. We find that the performance of these pools of marketplace loans depends on the expected default probability for an individual loan as well as on the default correlation across different loans in the portfolio. Our results show that investing in personal loans provides relatively stable returns that are significantly above the returns to US Treasuries during the same time period.
Our findings are based on loans issued through Lending Club (LC), the largest marketplace lending platform in the US (based on volume issued per year). The main innovative feature of LC appears to be the redistribution of profits historically captured by traditional financial institutions, such as banks, to individual borrowers in the form of lower interest rates and to the ultimate lenders as high abnormal returns. LC started operating as one of the first Facebook applications during 2007 (VentureBeat, 2007 by utilizing the existing trust among interlinked individuals of the social network. The lending service became sufficiently successful that LC grew into an independent, marketplace lending platform. From December 2007, the beginning of our sample, to March 2017, the end of our sample, LC have facilitated more than $20 billion in loans while paying more than $3 billion in interest to the independent lenders. Essentially, LC provides financial intermediation services at a much lower cost than traditional banks to this segment of borrowers (Milne and Parboteeah, 2016) .
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We are the first to use a unique dataset of LC loan payments with a monthly frequency, ranging from December 2007 until March 2017. Our data set is from monthly cash-flow information for each individual loan, provided by RiverNorth; a closed-end fund specialized in marketplace lending. 4 The data set of monthly observations on the loan payments include more than 23 million records. This data set covers the whole spectrum of consumer loans issued by LC, without any selection bias. We verified that the publicly available aggregates on annual loan volumes and on the number of issued loans match the number and volume of loans in our data.
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Each loan is carefully screened to ensure heterogeneous borrower characteristics along several dimensions (Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2017) including FICO ratings, employment status, home ownership, and geographic area (first 3 digits of the zip code). Given the level of access to detailed information, investors can carefully screen potential borrowers and browse these loans on the LC platform to build customized portfolios. Investors may also set mechanical rules to allocate capital to many loans within the different risk categories. As of 2017, more than 40 banks and more than 70 institutional investors provide capital to finance the loans originated by LC. In fact, banks were responsible for at least 40% of the total LC loan origination during the first, second and third quarter of 2017. 6 This level of participation suggests that many banks may find it at least as profitable to finance LC loans compared to developing a competing online platform.
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The initial balance of a personal loan ranges from $1,000 to $40,000. An individual can have as a maximum two active, independently managed loans at the same time. 8 Investors only decide what fraction of the specific loan to finance. Each loan is segmented into $25 notes, thus investors may form diversified loan portfolios with relatively small amounts of capital. For instance, a $5,000 investment can be used to form a loan portfolio including notes from 200 different loans. If no investor agrees to finance a loan request that is being listed, then the loan does not get issued. 9 A personal loan request remains active for up to 14 days. Once the funding is complete, and the borrower complies with the credit risk assessment of the platform, the borrower receives the requested loan, and is obliged to start making payments within 30 days.
Origination fees for personal loans range between 1% and 6% of the loan amount, due to the credit rating and other, unconventional items used for the risk assessment. The monthly payments include the standard components: the principal of the loan, plus the interest based on the borrower's risk profile.
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Previous work on marketplace lending has focused on two topics. First, marketplace lending received considerable attention in the context of financial intermediation, addressing questions such as the role of marketplace lending and how it changes the lending business of the traditional credit institutions for households (Berger and Gleisner, 2009; Michels, 2012; Miller, 2015; and Wei and Lin, 2016) . The second area of interest is the behavior of agents participating in marketplace lending. This research analyzes the selection process of individual lenders and the individual loan characteristics associated with eventual default (Herzenstein et. al, 2011a, b; Zhan and Liu, 2012; Lin et al., 2013; Lin and Viswanathan, 2015; Iyer et al., 2015; Dorfleitner et al., 2016; and Hertzberg et. al, 2016) .
Online financial intermediation for household credit allows many independent lenders to to assess the detailed characteristics of individual borrowers along several dimensions. One of the main information channels is voluntary disclosure directly from the borrower. As Lin et al. (2013) show, soft information provided by marketplace lenders contains valuable signals for risk assessment that might increase the performance of lending decisions.
It is clear that LC is able to assess the probability of loan default with considerable accuracy. For instance, Serrano-Cinca et al. (2015) show that there is a clear relationship between the credit category assigned to loans and the probability of default using publicly available data from LC. We confirm this pattern for LC credit categories. Moreover, we find that the risk-adjusted return for the loans in each credit risk category are virtually identical across different credit categories. This pattern indicates that the higher interest rate set by LC for loans deemed more risky is almost perfectly offset by higher default rates in general.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is a pioneering research work to address the performance of marketplace lending using transaction data of individual loans, thus providing a more feasible assessment on performance from the investor's point of view. Furthermore, our research is the first to address whether and to what extend marketplace lending as a new innovative approach to financial intermediation opens up investors an attractive asset class to invest. Finally, we provide as well a novel analytical design for performance evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses our data in detail, and the initial phases of our analysis. Section 3 discusses the specifics and the development of the monthly portfolio index return. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
II. Data and Initial Analysis
Our proprietary data includes monthly payment information of all LC loans that were financed between December 2007 and March 2017 matched to borrower characteristics measured at the time the loan is financed. This unique feature provides cash flows on a monthly basis for each loan so that it is not necessary to infer the timing of payments from the fixed public status.
We can calculate more accurate internal rate of returns (IRRs) as well as monthly portfolio returns, compared to previous research (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015; Herzberg et. al, 2016 statistics. First, the number of loans has increased rapidly in each of the credit categories and this rapid expansion took place later for the more risky loan categories. Second, the average loan size has typically increased within each credit category, although this increase has been much more modest than the increase in the number of loans. These two patterns indicate that the number of borrowers, rather than the size of the loan, is the main source of growth for this marketplace lending platform. Third, the average interest rate has remained stable or decreased for the less risky credit categories, while the average interest rate for more risky categories has slowly increased.
Lastly, the vast majority of loans are issued to relatively safe borrowers.
A thorough performance analysis of a loan portfolio begins with a monthly payment history for each issued loan after subtracting LC fees. Before considering risk-adjusted performance using a monthly return index generated cash flows, estimated changes in loan yields, and assumptions about the probability of default, we start with a more basic analysis of performance using IRR calculations. We form a portfolio containing all loans issued in a particular month. For each of the next 42 months, we sum all of the payments, net of LC fees, from the loans in the initial portfolio.
To ensure that we capture the vast majority of payments after the stated maturity of 36 months, we include an additional 6 months of payments. Given the 42 months of payment data for the loan portfolio and the combined balance at time of issue, we calculate the monthly internal rate of return of the loan portfolio for that issue month. We implement this procedure for each issue month in our data set for which we have at least 42 months of subsequent payment information. We present the statistics for the resulting time series of monthly IRRs for the LC loan portfolios in Panel A of Table 3 . We follow the same approach to evaluate the performance of portfolios for each issue month separately for all broad credit categories.
Based on the first column in Panel A of Table 3 shows that the interest rates are about twice as large for the risky credit categories compared to the relatively safe credit categories, the more risky credit categories must also have much higher loan default rates to offset the strong monotonic pattern for interest rates so that the average IRR is approximately unchanged across categories. However, the differences in volatility and loan default rates between categories are only associated with a very modest increase average performance. The relatively risky loan 13 Data for ICE BofAML US Corp 1-3yr Total Return Index Value is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website (FRED). 14 The IRR for each issue month exhibits considerable volatility within a credit category. Indeed, we find negative IRRs for some issue months during the financial crisis of 2008/09. Since the financial crisis occurs during the sample period, the average IRRs in Table 3 may actually be substantially lower than than the expected IRRs for these loan portfolios in the future.
portfolios tend to have slightly higher average IRRs compared to relatively safe portfolios. The average monthly IRR for Category A is 0.40% and the average monthly IRR for Category D is 0.46%, but this difference is not statistically significant. While it could be the case that the difference in volatility or default rates across credit categories is due entirely to idiosyncratic characteristics that should not receive a risk premium, it is much more likely that the relatively risky loan portfolio has greater exposure to systematic risk.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify systematic risk exposure directly from the IRR measure. In this context, the rate of loan defaults, especially during the financial crisis, should be correlated with systematic risk exposure. We use two consecutive missed loan payments as a proxy for loan default. 15 Panel A of Figure 1 shows the percentage of all borrowers that miss two consecutive payments during each quarter. This percentage increases dramatically during the financial crisis. This pattern of default is also visible for the percentage of the outstanding loan balance owed by borrowers that miss two consecutive payments. Thus, loan default appears to be systematically risky. For example, Panel B of Figure 1 shows that Category D has a much greater rate of loan defaults especially during the financial crisis compared to Category A. Nevertheless, the average IRR for Category D is only a few basis points higher than the IRR for Category A and this difference is not statistically significant. The average IRR for the loan portfolios is not tightly linked in the cross-section to the variation in the exposure to systematic default risk for the credit categories. Thus, the most obvious measure of systematic risk, exposure to systematic loan default, appears to be virtually unrelated to the average IRR of the loan portfolios.
While we conduct a formal analysis of risk-adjusted performance for LC loan portfolios in a subsequent section, the apparent absence of a relation between IRR performance and systematic risk proxies across credit categories raises an important question. In this particular implementation of marketplace lending, LC sets the price, that is, the interest rate while the borrowers and lenders only accept/reject the particular opportunity. To the extent that LC has market power, there may be a range of interest rates that both borrowers and lenders would be willing to accept. Unlike the stock market, or to a lesser extent the corporate bond market, the resulting securities are not 15 In Table 4 we confirm that this definition is highly correlated with the eventual failure of the borrower to make any subsequent payments, that is, loan default.
frequently traded following origination. 16 Hence, the typical forces that lead to market efficiency in terms of the price observed in public markets may not be relevant for LC loans. Consequently, the potential absence of a strong trade-off between risk characteristics and expected return is less surprising in this context.
III. Monthly loan portfolio return index
To construct a monthly loan portfolio return index, we need to infer the value of existing loans every month using the data set containing the complete payment history for each issued loan.
We use this payment history to identify the timing of both missing and partial payments. These payment irregularities increase the probability of loan default considerably and we use this information to estimate loan value every month. Table 4 shows the relevant statistics. Panel A focuses on the probability of borrowers making any subsequent payments, that is loan default, after a given pattern missed payments or partial payments. For each rating class, it is clear that the probability that the borrower does not make any subsequent loan payments increases with each consecutive missed payment. Conditional on missing even one payment, the probability of loan default is virtually identical across credit categories. Rather than using LC's definition for a loan charge off, in our construction of monthly loan index returns, we set the return for a particular constituent loan in the index to -1 at the end of the month following two consecutive missed payments. This assumption will slightly understate loan portfolio performance in our tests because about 13% of these loans with two consecutive missed payments do eventually make at least one subsequent payment. Waiting until there are three consecutive missed payments before setting the loan return to -1 does not change the abnormal performance estimates substantially. 17 Using this alternative definition of loan default, the percentage of loans that make any subsequent payments after exhibiting this pattern is less than 7%.
Panel B shows the probability of each loan status within each credit category.
Unsurprisingly, the probability of missing a payment or missing two consecutive payments increases monotonically from Category A to Category EFG. Missing loan payments are much more common than partial loan payments. Interestingly, a second consecutive partial loan payment is associated with a substantial decrease in the probability that there are no subsequent loan payments, that is, a loan default is not particularly likely. Of course, it is still the case that a loan default is more likely following one partial payment or two consecutive partial payments compared to loans that are current. We take into account the increased default probability based on any payment irregularity. As soon as we detect a partial payment or a missed payment we revalue the remaining scheduled payments on the loan using the highest interest rate for all LC loans. These loans will use this elevated interest rate until the borrower returns to the original payment schedule.
Next, we explain our methodology to calculate the monthly loan portfolio return index.
Since we do not observe market prices, we must estimate the present value of the remaining scheduled payments to reflect changes in the term structure and default probabilities. More specifically, we update the discount rate to be equal to the interest rate of newly issued LC loans with the same sub-credit category, (e.g., A4) for loans that are current. This benchmark should reflect the changes in market conditions and also changes in credit category-specific credit spread forecast by LC. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the average interest rate for each credit category over time. The interest rates for LC loans are remarkably stable within each credit category, especially during the financial crisis period. This pattern raises the possibility that the interest rates for each credit category that are assigned by LC may reflect other strategic considerations beyond the fundamental risk properties of the loans in the category.
To ensure that the results do not depend on LC assigned interest rates we also calculate the present value of the remaining scheduled payments using an alternative interest rate series, based on credit card asset backed securities (ABS) yields. Panel B depicts the value-weighted yield for a portfolio of credit card ABS available from Datastream. Those yields may better reflect market conditions and default expectations for consumer loans because these fixed income instruments are traded to some extent. In an alternative specification, we use changes in the yield for credit card ABS along with the original LC interest rate to calculate the appropriate discount rate for subsequent scheduled payments.
To calculate the portfolio returns of LC loans, we start with the following equation:
where CFi,t+1 is the loan payment for loan i just before the beginning of period t+1 (net of the LC fee of 1%), Vi,t is value of the remaining scheduled loan payments for loan i at the beginning of period t based on data available at time t, and Vi,t+1 is the value of the remaining scheduled loan payments for loan i at the beginning of period t+1 based on data available at time t+1. This equation is the value-weighted return for any portfolio of securities. The difficulty in our context is that we do not observe the value of the loan at the beginning and at the end of every month from market prices or market-based yields.
We implement our analysis with three different proxies for the unobserved market yield.
First, we assume that the interest rate, that is the yield to maturity, for newly originated LC loans is the correct discount rate for the remaining scheduled payments for all current loans in the credit category. The value of loan i at time t is then calculated accordingly,
where Ct+j is the scheduled payment at t+j, and yi,t is the discount rate for scheduled payment and is set to yZ,t, the interest rate on all newly issued loans in the same narrow credit category at time t. Therefore, if a particular loan was originally in Category A3 and the loan status remains current, then the interest rate used to calculate the present value of the remaining loan payments is the interest newly issued loans in Category A3. Hence, the present value of the loan could increase due to a significant fall in interest rates even though the outstanding balance decreases with each loan payment. If the loan is not current, that is, there have been partial payments or missing payments that have not been rectified, then yi,t is the interest rate on all newly issued loans in the lowest narrow credit category. If loan i has two consecutive missed payments, then we set Vi,t+1 to zero and CFi,t+1 is zero due to the missed payment, and therefore, the net return for the loan in this month is -1. This loan is then removed from the loan portfolio index in subsequent months.
Second, it may be the case that the interest rates set by LC do not reflect changing market conditions and default probabilities in the consumer loan market. To address this possibility, we use an alternative assumption to specify the discount rate for scheduled payments. We set the discount rate in the present value calculation for loan i as follows
where yi,0 is the interest rate set at origination, and yABS,0 -yABS,0 is the change in the yield on credit card ABS since loan origination. This alternative approach embeds the time series variation in the default spread for credit card lending to discount the cash flows of LC loans.
Lastly, we confirm that the use of the time variation in LC interest rates or credit card ABS yields are not the source of our findings. In the third specification, we shut down the influence of variation in default rates and monetary policy by assuming that the discounted value of the loan is the outstanding loan balance. Implicitly, this approach assumes that the original interest rate is the correct discount rate for the remaining scheduled payments.
IV. Results
Our results indicate that the risk-adjusted performance of our monthly return index for LC loans is large and statistically significant. In addition to high returns, we also observe a low volatility of returns. The average monthly return is 0.40%. In general, monthly returns in different credit categories vary between 45 basis points (bps) to 39 bps, except for Category EFG with an average return of 28 bps. The average monthly volatility is 0.36%, increasing monotonically by credit category, ranging from 0.21% to 0.77%. Combining these two observations, the Sharpe ratios available from LC loans are as high as 1.02. This average Sharpe ratio is 6.54 times larger than the Sharpe ratio of 0.16 for the US stock market during the same time period, whereas this ratio reached only 0.12 from 1926 until 2017. The Sharpe ratios of credit category specific returns decrease monotonically when credit risk increases, ranging from 1.85 to 0.34. We revisit the calculated portfolio level returns series to estimate how much commonly used factor models explain the performance of marketplace loans. Investors investing in marketplace lending loans are exposed to three primary risks: Interest rate risk, prepayment risk, and credit risk. In the following, we apply various commonly used factor models both from the equity and fixed income markets. Our results show that the abnormal performance of LC loans is not driven by the chosen risk factor model. Thus, traditional risk factors only explain the performance of marketplace loans at small extent.
To show the robustness of our results, we apply different factor models on our LC loan return series. Then, we show that our assumptions related to discount rate, i.e., using the interest rates of newly issued loans to discount scheduled payments, are robust by showing that the performance is unaffected if we replace these discount rates with discount rates calculated using credit card ABS yields. Second, we show that the results are also unaffected if we use nominal loan balances as our proxies for prices. Finally, in unreported test, we revisit our conservative evaluation approach on the default spread of LC loans, and assume direct defaulting after three missed payments. The results of these regressions, especially the highly statistically significant alphas, allow us to consider marketplace lending as an attractive asset class. Table 5 depicts our analytical results using the Fama-French 3-factor (1993 , 1996 and 5-factor models (2016) with and without the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. This analysis allows us to show how big proportion of LC performance can be explained by standard equity factors.
We also consider standard fixed income factors such as the default spread (the return on Baclays
Corporate bond index minus the return on Barclays Treasury bond index), and the term spread (the return on 5Y Treasury bonds minus the return on 1M Treasury note).
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The results show that standard factors can only explain small proportion of the performance of LC loans. The alphas are in the range of 36 to 40 bps per month depending on the specification, and always highly statistically significant. The most significant factors are the market factor and momentum. Both are significantly positive in every specification. Even though market beta is significant, its value is very close to zero. The significance of momentum seems to be partly driven by its exceptionally low performance in 2009, as unreported test results show that the estimated coefficient is only half of the full sample coefficient and insignificant if we exclude observations before 2010. All other factors are insignificant. In general, the explanatory power of all factor models is low, with the highest R 2 being 0.18. 18 We also tested whether our results are affected if we also control the return of short-term bonds (1-3 years to maturity) and unreported results confirm the robustness of our results. 19 We use Newey West standard errors with 12 lags. Unreported tests show that the results are robust to different lag lengths, i.e., from 0 to 36. risk is only 31 bps. However, the differences in abnormal performance are not statistically significant. All alphas except the EFG alpha are highly statistically significant. The significance of alphas decreases monotonically consistent with the increasing risk. The significance of risk factors varies a lot depending on the credit category. For example, market betas are positive and significant in credit categories with medium risk, and momentum is positive and significant in high credit risk categories. The term spread is also significantly negative in Category A. Table 7 are insignificant. The explanatory power of all factor models is higher than in Table 5 . Table 8 shows that our earlier credit category-specific results are robust. Monthly alphas are in the range of 43 bps to 49 bps, except that the alpha of the credit category with the highest risk is only 28 bps. All alphas are statistically significant, though the alpha of EFG is only borderline significant. The statistical significance of alphas is almost monotonically decreasing in credit category, i.e., Category A has a little bit lower t-statistic than Category B. Note than none of the differences in alphas between categories are statistically significant. The market betas are positive but significant only for the credit category with the lowest risk. The default spread is positive and significant in most of the credit categories.
Finally in Table 9 , we also consider the performance of LC loans based on return series where we assume that the value of the loan is equal to the remaining nominal loan balance. Similar results as above confirm the robustness of our results. Alphas are ranging from 39 bps to 41 bps depending on the specification and are always statistically highly significant. The momentum factor has a significantly positive beta. All other factors are insignificant.
In sum, the performed factor analysis shows that the abnormal performance of the LC return series cannot be eliminated with any considered factor model. In overall, the considered factor models only explain small proportion of the variation in LC returns. Interestingly, the alpha is always highly statistically significantly positive.
V. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the risk and return characteristics of marketplace lending by evaluating the performance of personal loan portfolios, using a unique data set of monthly loan transactions.
We argue that the innovative feature of marketplace lending is that it provides a different distribution channel for profit: The generated abnormal returns are redistributed among both the borrowers and the lenders engaging in marketplace lending, as opposed to being captured only by traditional financial institutions, such as banks. We selected Lending Club to perform our analysis, as this platform is the biggest marketplace lending platform in the US in terms of annual transaction volume.
Our findings proves the existence of substantial abnormal returns of personal loan portfolios, generated via marketplace lending. The average monthly return is 0.40% and average monthly volatility is 0.36%. The Sharpe ratios available from LC loans are as high as 1.02, and those are decreasing monotonically by credit category, ranging from 1.85 to 0.34.
The abnormal returns of these personal loan portfolios are more analogous to the potential for private equity funds to generate abnormal performance. If our findings on substantial abnormal returns is expected to persist, then this superior performance will attract more capital, similar to the pattern of investment behavior in private equity funds (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) . We expect therefore the development of a new market equilibrium; either as a result of increasing competition, or as a result of decreasing loan quality on average. Following the parallel analogy, both cases would potentially result in the radical decrease of these abnormal returns, since personal loans in marketplace lending would reach an equilibrium with other fixed income securities.
Recent signals of the market, however, indicate turbulences and the growing shadow of distrust in these investments (Financial Times, 2017) . High performance might be needed to compensate investors to take default risk of LC as a company. Ever since its IPO, the market value of LC stocks, as well as the likelihood of investing into LC's issued loans was put on a rollercoaster, indicating a rather skeptical resonance of the market on LC's operations (TMR, 2016) . In addition, the news of an internal fraud, leading to the resignation of the CEO and founder
Renaud Laplanche in May 2016, have overshadowed its prosperous growth.
Our analysis is based on the whole spectrum of personal loans. Therefore, we might consider performing a more detailed analysis in the future, segmenting the performance analysis along different credit categories. Furthermore, by random sampling we could define different portfolio strategies and show the effect of diversification on loan performance. Our current results on the whole data set prove lower performance attached to riskier categories, so an optimal strategy to reach good performance might be against broad diversification. This hypothesis needs, however, further investigation. Based on the redistribution of abnormal returns, an interesting question is to explore the optimal win-win strategy for all stakeholders involved. This table shows the summary statistics for Lending Club (LC) loans with 36 months until maturity. The reported statistics are number of loans, average loan size, and average interest rate by broad credit category and issue year. The broad credit categories, such as A, B, C, and D are determined using a proprietary assessment of credit worthiness of each loan by LC. This assessment uses variables including FICO score, employment status, home ownership, and geographic area (first 3 digits of the zip code). The interest rate for each loan is assigned by LC and is directly linked to the more narrow credit grades within each broad credit category, such as A1 through A6 in broad category A. We combine broad credit categories E, F, and G within each year. 
